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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Slovakia’s 2020  
Elections
Political Puzzling with Power  
and Populism
Slovakia is facing a decisive moment. 
At the end of February, the country will 
hold its first general elections since 
mass anti-corruption protests shook 
its political establishment and toppled 
veteran populist prime minister Robert 
Fico. While Slovakia is seen as a lead-
er in the fight for democracy in Central 
Europe, political programs and ideas 
have been side-lined by a pre-election 
campaign that has turned into a clash 
of emotions and populist moves.
Parliamentary elections on Febru-
ary 29, 2020, will put Slovaks back 
on a political roller coaster. Less 
than a year after the country elected 
 Zuzana  Caputova – female, liberal, and 
pro-European – as president, its polit-
ical landscape is facing another shift. 
Voters are engaged in the process and 
turnout is expected to be very high. 
Current estimates show that close to 
70 percent of the population will par-
ticipate, exceeding the 60 percent of 
the last general elections in 2016. Polls 
show that about one fifth of voters will 
decide on a candidate in the final days 
before the election.
Consequently, it is not yet clear which 
parties and leaders will determine the 
course of Slovak politics in the after-
math of these elections. They could be 
a turning point in which a younger po-
litical elite, who is ideologically more 
diverse and whose agenda is more al-
lied with its Western European peers, 
takes over. In such a case, Slovakia, 
which is located between  Poland and 
Hungary, could become even more of 
a pro-EU anchor for the whole Vise-
grad Group – in addition to being its 
only eurozone member and a staunch 
 political ally of Germany. But these 
elections could also result in a peri-
od of domestic gridlock, weakness, 
and instability. They could turn out to 
merely usher in an interim phase in 
which the country’s political landscape 
continues to drift in search of a more 
stable arrangement.
Although Slovakia’s politics have been 
characterized by instability for years, 
particularly on the center right, the 
current level of volatility is unprece-
dented. Chances are a record num-
ber of 10 to 11 parties and alliances will 
make it over the electoral threshold, 
likely producing a parliament that is 
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more fragmented than ever. The good 
news is that this fragmentation would 
not necessarily go hand in hand with 
the strengthening of anti-EU and illib-
eral forces. Even if the far-right Popu-
lar Party of Our Slovakia (LSNS) gains 
more ground – it is currently in third 
place, polling at around 13 percent (in 
the elections of 2016 it got 8 percent) 
– it is unlikely to shape the agenda or 
become a kingmaker in the new par-
liament. A big unknown, however, is 
the future course of the ruling par-
ty, Smer-Social Democracy (Smer-
SD). After dominating Slovak politics 
for more than a decade, the left-wing 
populist party of Robert Fico – who 
stayed party chairman after resign-
ing as prime minister in 2018 – is like-
ly to be voted out of power. The extent 
to which Smer-SD will embrace the il-
liberal agenda and cooperate with the 
 extremist LSNS remains to be seen.
A DIVIDED OPPOSITION 
AND A DARK HORSE
The new parties of the centrist oppo-
sition were unable to unite into a sin-
gle block and maintain the momentum 
that resulted from the protests and 
President Caputova’s impressive victo-
ry. They are currently divided between 
the left-liberal party Progressive Slo-
vakia (PS), which is allied with the cen-
ter-right Spolu (“Together”), and the 
“For the People” party of former Pres-
ident Andrej Kiska, which has a more 
conservative profile. Both of these par-
ties were polling just below 10 percent. 
PS could not find another candidate 
with the political talent and communi-
cation skills of Caputova, who reached 
voters beyond the party’s core urban 
constituency.
Still, one dark horse candidate has 
emerged for the opposition: Igor 
 Matovic, the 46-year-old leader of the 
politically established anti-graft move-
ment Ordinary People and Indepen-
dent Personalities (OLANO). Matovic 
has best understood the wave of public 
anger over corruption and has surfed 
upon it to emerge as the unexpected 
favorite. His party has also consistently 
reached out to the countryside and all 
societal groups online. It has not shied 
away from populist moves, such as 
basing its party program on the results 
of an open internet survey. In a recent 
poll, OLANO was at over 15 percent, 
neck-and-neck with Smer-SD, the rul-
ing party. If the centrist opposition will 
be able to form the next government, 
the center-right populist Matovic is its 
most likely candidate for prime minis-
ter. A skillful communicator, he is un-
tested by government office and has a 
reputation of unpredictability.
FICO’S SMER-SD 
UNDER PRESSURE
The latest poll by the agency Focus had 
Smer-SD retaining a narrow lead with 
around 17 percent, but the ruling par-
ty has been steadily losing support. Af-
ter the investigation of the February 
2018 murder of investigative journalist 
Jan Kuciak and his fiancée  unearthed a 
corrupt web of politicians, judges, po-
lice officers, and businessmen around 
the ruling party, Smer-SD will most 
likely not be able to find a new coali-
tion partner in the next parliament. 
The Slovak National Party (SNS), its 
junior coalition partner, is current-
ly polling at around 3 percent and un-
likely to make it over the electoral 
threshold.
Still, Smer-SD needs to secure a rel-
atively strong position to be able to 
 protect its members and business net-
works from prosecution – perhaps by, 
as mentioned above, not shying away 
from cooperating with the far-right 
LSNS. While Prime Minister Peter 
 Pellegrini, who has led the ruling par-
ty’s pre-election campaign, has prom-
ised not to work with these extremists, 
party chairman Robert Fico has already 
engaged LSNS in a tacit alliance in the 
outgoing parliament.
As a sign of how high the stakes are in 
the frenetic lead-up to these elections, 
Fico emerged from the background of 
Smer-SD’s campaign to arrange a spe-
cial session of the parliament after 
it was already formally in recess. In a 
fast-track procedure on February 24, 
2020 – just five days before elections 
are held – the outgoing parliament in-
troduced a thirteenth month of pen-
sions to be paid by the end of 2020 to 
the tune of 400 million euros from the 
state budget. With the help of the rep-
resentatives from SNS and LSNS, as 
well as a few individual members of 
parliament, Fico managed to get the 
biggest social package of the current 
government approved. Simultaneous-
ly, he turned the tables on the centrist 
opposition and President Caputova, 
who still needs to either sign the mea-
sure for it to become law or return it 
back to the incoming parliament. This 
shrewd populist trick by the veteran 
political operator has the potential to 
sway votes to Smer-SD and would, if 
enacted, have fiscal consequences for 
the next government.
Regardless of its next government, 
Slovakia will turn inward
Slovakia’s 2020 Elections
3No. 6 | February 2020
COMMENTARY
Rauchstraße 17/18 
10787 Berlin
Tel. +49 30 25 42 31 -0
info@dgap.org 
www.dgap.org 
 @dgapev
The German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful 
foreign and security policy on a German and 
European level that promotes democracy, 
peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan 
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP).
Publisher 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für  
Auswärtige Politik e.V.
ISSN 1864-347
Editing Helga Beck  
 
Layout Andreas Alvarez
Design Concept: WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAP
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
 Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 
 International License.
CHANCES FOR A 
COALITION AND CHANGE
If the opposition parties win enough 
seats to oust Fico’s ruling party, it 
would herald a generational change 
and a new era in Slovak politics. In or-
der for an opposition coalition to take 
power in Bratislava, it would need to be 
made up of five to six parties with very 
diverse platforms – from the left-lean-
ing progressives to the traditional-
ly conservative Christian democrats. 
Such a broad centrist coalition would 
include Slovak members of three par-
ty groups that are represented in the 
European Parliament: the center-right 
European People’s Party (EPP), the lib-
eral Renew Europe, and the  European 
Conservative and Reformist (ECR) 
Group. Such a coalition might, howev-
er, also be dependent on the support 
of the small conservative populist par-
ty “We are the Family,” which is led by 
media celebrity Boris Kollar and whose 
partners at the EU level are far-right 
Eurosceptics.
Some vagueness or f lexibility in the 
programs of these parties could be an 
advantage for helping such a diverse 
coalition to succeed – especially since 
most tensions and divisions in the Slo-
vak electorate stem from cultural is-
sues such as registered partnerships 
or gay marriages, as well as approach-
es to migration. But how long could 
such a fragile arrangement in Bratisla-
va last? On the one hand, it would be 
difficult to manage politically. On the 
other hand, there will be huge pres-
sure from Slovak society for it to hold 
together until some tangible results 
are achieved, particularly on measures 
related to anti-corruption and law 
enforcement.
After the popular vote, the most con-
sequential step in moving forward with 
anti-corruption investigations and 
 renewing the people’s trust in state in-
stitutions will be the election by parlia-
ment in mid-2020 of a new prosecutor 
general, the nomination of whom has 
to be approved by President Caputova.
RAMIFICATIONS FOR 
THE EU AND GERMANY
If the new government is formed by 
the broad centrist coalition, it will 
take a more proactive approach to 
some parts of the EU’s agenda, includ-
ing the Green Deal. If the cabinet will 
be headed by Igor Matovic, the cen-
ter-right EPP will gain another prime 
minister but also a potential new head-
ache in Central Europe. Matovic is 
socially conservative, populist, and not 
very predictable. His OLANO party 
only switched political affiliation from 
the eurosceptic ECR Group last year, 
for example. Yet regardless of who 
forms the next government, Slova-
kia will be turning inward rather than 
punching above its weight at the EU 
level.
Following its own national preferences 
might also make Slovakia more willing 
to keep some distance from the Vise-
grad Group and become more close-
ly aligned with Germany and France. 
But because having its own agenda 
will also make Slovakia a less predict-
able partner, Berlin and Paris would be 
well-advised to engage with its new 
government and prime minister from 
the outset.
In his interview with Reuters on Feb-
ruary 24, 2020, Igor Matovic pointed-
ly took a swipe at right-wing govern-
ments in neighboring Hungary and 
Poland that have clashed with the EU 
over the rule of law and media free-
doms, saying: “We want to show in 
this election that Central Europe has 
not gone crazy.” It remains to be seen, 
however, if the elections in Slovakia 
will prove his point.
